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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory is based on the idea that the preference of the decision maker
(DM) is revealed from her choice behavior (see Chambers and Echenique (2016) for a
comprehensive survey). Alternative x is revealed to be preferred to alternative y if and
only if x is chosen when y is also available. Note that, to draw inferences from the choice
behavior, one need not only observe the alternative that is chosen, but also which other
alternatives are available to the DM.1
The latter requirement that the observer observes what alternatives are available to the
DM presents some challenges in the matching markets. For a simple example, in the school
choice setting, if Ann is matched with School A and not with School B, it may be that she
prefers School A to School B, but it may also be that School B admits other students who
have higher priorities than Ann at School B.
In this note, we study the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in
two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Throughout this note, we present
our results using the school choice model in which students are matched with schools. It is
assumed that the schools’ priority orderings are known. A data set of matchings is said
to be rationalizable if there exists a profile of the students’ preferences such that every
matching in the data set is stable given the students’ preferences and the schools’ priority
orderings.
We provide two approaches to test the rationalizability of a data set. As we assume
that the schools’ priority orderings are known, a natural way to proceed is to first identify
the alternatives available to each student, and then reveal the students’ preferences. For
example, suppose that Ann is matched with School A and Bob is matched with School B.
If we know that Ann has higher priority than Bob at School B, then we can conclude that
School B is available to Ann. Since Ann is matched with School A, we can further conclude
that Ann prefers School A to School B. Indeed, the rationalizability of a data set can be
characterized via an acyclicity condition, that is, the revealed preferences of each student
are not cyclical.
Our main result provides an indirect approach to test the rationalizability of a data set.
This approach connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure
of the set of stable matchings, where the latter says that the set of stable matchings forms a
1Hu et al. (2018) study the (coarse) revealed preference theory in settings in which the observer does
not observe the DM’s exact choice.
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distributive lattice (see, for example, Knuth (1976), Blair (1984), and Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)).
The exact conditions for rationalizability of a data set will be made clear in the formal
analysis. Here, we provide some discussion on how to apply the lattice structure result to
conduct the revealed preference test. For any two mappings µ and µ′, we define their join
(with respect to the schools) λ = µ ∨ µ′ such that λ maps each school s to its preferred
set of students between µ(s) and µ′(s). Analogously, we define their meet (with respect to
the schools) ν = µ ∧ µ′ such that ν maps each school s to its less preferred set of students
between µ(s) and µ′(s). Suppose that a data set D is rationalizable. By definition, there
exists a profile of the students’ preferences such that every matching in D is stable given the
students’ preferences and the schools’ priority orderings. It follows from the lattice structure
result that the join and meet of any two matchings in D are well-defined matchings. Thus,
if the join (or the meet) is not a well-defined matching, for example, if a student is mapped
to two schools in the join (or the meet), then the data set is not rationalizable. Example
2 in Section 3.2 applies this logic to show that a given data set is not rationalizable by
constructing the join and meet of two matchings and verifying that they are not well-defined
matchings.
The logic above can be substantially generalized by iteratively constructing the join
and meet of mappings. If at any stage, either the join or the meet of two mappings is not a
well-defined matching, then we can refute the rationalizability of the data set. Utilizing the
lattice structure result, we establish that a necessary condition for the rationalizability of
a data set is that all the joins and meets that are iteratively constructed in this way are
well-defined matchings. However, this is not sufficient, as illustrated by Example 3 and
Example 4 in section 3.2.
To deal with the issues associated with these two examples, we also connect our revealed
preference analysis to (1) the celebrated Lone Wolf Theorem (see, for example, Roth
and Sotomayor (1990, Theorem 5.12)) that states that the set of students matched and
school seats filled is the same for all stable matchings; and (2) Theorem 5.27 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) that states that the set of each school’s matches in stable matchings is
responsively ordered.2
Our main result, Theorem 1, shows that a data set D is rationalizable if and only if
2We say that a school’s matches in a set of matchings are responsively ordered if for any two matchings
in the set µ and µ′, this school prefers its match in µ to its match in µ′ implies that this school prefers
every student it matches with at µ to every student it matches with at µ′ but not at µ.
3
1. every mapping that is iteratively constructed by taking the joins and meets is a
well-defined matching;
2. the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same for all matchings in D;
3. the set of each school’s matches in D is responsively ordered.
These conditions are tight. We have a series of examples illustrating that none of the three
conditions can be dropped. For each condition, we have an example of a data set in which
the other two conditions are satisfied and the data set is not rationalizable.
Our proof is constructive. If a data set is rationalizable, we explicitly construct a class
of the students’ preferences such that every matching in the data set is stable given any
preferences of the students in this class and the schools’ priority orderings.
In the special case of one-to-one matching markets, the third condition that the set
of each school s’s matches in D is responsively ordered is vacuous. Thus, the first two
conditions are necessary and sufficient for the rationalizability of a data set in one-to-one
matching markets.
Echenique (2008) studies the testable implications of two-sided matching theory when
the preferences of agents on both sides of the market are unknown. In contrast, we assume
that the schools’ priority orderings are known. This additional structure enables us to
derive sharper results by connecting the revealed preference analysis to the lattice structure
of the set of stable matchings. In particular, one can work out the join and meet of two
mappings only when the preferences of agents on one side of the market are known. More
recently, Echenique et al. (2013) investigate the revealed preference theory of aggregate
matchings, which differ from the individual level matchings studied in the current paper.
Haeringer and Iehlé (forthcoming) also study two-sided matching markets with one-sided
preferences. By considering only the preferences of agents on one side of the market, they
show how one can identify impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be
matched together. Identifying impossible matches is extremely valuable, because they
can be used to narrow down the set of stable matchings that may emerge. This note
complements their paper and asks, for a given data set of matchings, whether there exists
a profile of the students’ preferences such that every matching in the data set is stable
given the students’ preferences and the schools’ priority orderings. To relate the results
in Haeringer and Iehlé (forthcoming) to our analysis, if any of the matchings in the data
set contains an impossible match, the data set is not rationalizable. But if none of the
matchings in the data set contains an impossible match, their results are silent about the
rationalizability of the data set.
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2 Model
The school choice model. Throughout the paper, we shall present our results using the
school choice model in which students are matched with schools. There is a finite set I of
students to be matched with a finite set S of schools. We denote by i a generic student,
denote by s a generic school, and denote by a a generic agent (student or school). The
capacity of school s is qs, i.e., school s can admit at most qs students.
Each student i ∈ I has a strict preference i over S ∪{i}, where i stands for the outside
option of remaining unmatched. The relation s i s′ means that student i prefers to be
matched with school s rather than being matched with school s′, and the relation s i i
means that student i prefers to be matched with school s rather than remaining unmatched.
Each student i’s preference i over S ∪ {i} is her private information.
Each school s ∈ S is endowed with a strict priority ordering s over I ∪ {s}, where s
stands for the outside option of being unmatched. The relation i s i′ means that student
i has higher priority than student i′ at school s, and the relation i s s means that school
s prefers to be matched with student i rather than remaining unmatched. Note that even
though we have specified each school’s priority ordering over individual students, each
school with capacity larger than one must be able to compare sets of students. We assume
that each school’s priority ordering over sets of students is responsive.3 A priority ordering
over sets of students is responsive (to the priority ordering over individual students) if
for any two subsets A and A′ of I ∪ {s} such that they differ by only one element, i.e.,
A′ = A ∪ {i′} \ {i} (resp. A′ = A ∪ {i′}), A′ has a higher priority than A at school s if and
only if i′ s i (resp. i′ s s). To economize on notations, we shall also use s to denote
the responsive priority ordering over sets of students. This should not cause any confusion.
The schools’ priority orderings {s}s∈S are assumed to be known.
A school choice market is denoted by Γ = (I, S, {i}i∈I , {qs,s}s∈S). For a given relation
a, we write <a for the weak relation associated with it, i.e., a′′ <a a′ ⇐⇒ a′′ a a′ or
a′′ = a′.
Matchings and stable matchings. To give a formal definition of a matching, we first
define for any set X an unordered family of elements of X to be a collection of elements,
not necessarily distinct, in which the order is immaterial. A matching µ is a function from
the set I ∪ S into the set of unordered families of elements of I ∪ S such that:
(1) |µ(i)| = 1 for every student i and µ(i) = i if µ(i) /∈ S;
3See Roth and Sotomayor (1990, pp. 127-128) for further discussions on responsive priority orderings.
We will discuss non-responsive priority orderings over sets of students in Section 4.3.
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(2) |µ(s)| = qs for every school s, and if the number of students in µ(s), say r, is less
than qs, then µ(s) contains qs − r copies of s; and
(3) µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s).
In words, each student is either unmatched or assigned to a school that admits her, and
each school is either matched with students up to its capacity or left with some vacancies.
A matching will sometimes be represented as a set of matched pairs. For example, the
matching
µ =
i1, i4, (s1) i3 i2
s1 s2 (i2)
has i1 and i4 matched with s1 who has a capacity q1 = 3, i3 matched with s2 who has
a capacity q2 = 1, and i2 remaining unmatched. We denote by M the set of all possible
matchings.
A matching µ is said to be stable if
(1) it is individually rational, i.e.,
µ(i) <i i for all i ∈ I, and a <s s for all s ∈ S and all a ∈ µ(s); and
(2) it is unblocked, i.e.,
there exists no pair (i, s) such that s i µ(i) and i s a for some a ∈ µ(s).
We denote by Σ({i}i∈I , {s}s∈S) the set of stable matchings with respect to the
students’ preferences {i}i∈I and the schools’ priority orderings {s}s∈S. Since we assume
that the schools’ priority orderings are known, for notational simplicity, we write Σ({i}i∈I)
rather than Σ({i}i∈I , {s}s∈S).
The relation a can be straightforwardly extended to a preference over matchings. We
say that an agent prefers matching µ to matching µ′ if she prefers her match in µ to her
match in µ′. We abuse the notations slightly and write µ a µ′ (resp. µ <a µ′) if and
only if µ(a) a µ′(a) (resp. µ(a) <a µ′(a)). We impose the partial order ≥S on the set M ,
where µ ≥S µ′ if and only if µ <s µ′ for all s ∈ S.
Rationalizability of a data set. A data set D is a collection of matchings {µk}k∈K ,
where K is a finite index set. The interpretation of D is that it describes K observations of
the matching outcomes of a matching market.
A data setD is said to be rationalizable if there exists a profile of the students’ preferences
{i}i∈I such that
D ⊆ Σ({i}i∈I).
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In words, a data set is rationalizable if there exists a profile of the students’ preferences such
that every matching in the data set is a stable matching given the students’ preferences
and the schools’ priority orderings. Obviously, a data set D is rationalizable only if every
matching in D is individually rational for all schools, which is a necessary condition that is
immediately verifiable. To avoid redundant discussions, we assume throughout the paper
that every matching in D is individually rational for all schools.
Graph-theoretic terminology. We collect some graph-theoretic terminology used in the
sequel. A directed graph is a pair G = (V,E), where V is a set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V
is a set of edges. A path in G is a sequence p = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vN〉 such that (vn, vn+1) ∈ E for
n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. A cycle in G is a path c = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vN〉 with v0 = vN .
3 Results
We provide two approaches to test the rationalizability of a data set. Section 3.1 conducts
the revealed preference analysis in a direct manner. That is, we first use the data set to
reveal which alternatives are available to each student, and then proceed to characterize the
rationalizability of a data set via an acyclicity condition. Section 3.2 connects the revealed
preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and
tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings.
3.1 Revealed available alternatives and revealed preference
Since the schools’ priority orderings are known, we can first use the data set to reveal which
other alternatives are available to each student. The analysis is straightforward. For a
given matching µk ∈ D, school s is revealed to be available to student i if i has higher
priority than some agent a ∈ µk(s) at s. More formally, for each k ∈ K and each i ∈ I, the
collection of schools that are revealed to be available to i under µk is
A(i, µk) := {s ∈ S : s 6= µk(i) and there exists a ∈ µk(s) such that i s a}.
We can then proceed to reveal the students’ preferences. If the data setD is rationalizable,
then µk is a stable matching for all k ∈ K. Since the schools in A(i, µk) are available to
student i, it must be that i prefers her match under µk to each school in A(i, µk). Since
student i always has the option of remaining unmatched, it must be that i prefers her match
under µk to remaining unmatched whenever i is matched with a school. We summarize the
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analysis above using the following set:
R(i) :=
( ⋃
k∈K
{
(µk(i), s) : s ∈ A(i, µk)
})⋃( ⋃
k∈K:µk(i) 6=i
{
(µk(i), i)
})
, (1)
where
(1) (µk(i), s) ∈ R(i) means that µk(i) is revealed to be preferred to s by i; and
(2) (µk(i), i) ∈ R(i) means that µk(i) is revealed to be preferred to remaining unmatched
by i.
By construction, for each i ∈ I, (S ∪ {i}, R(i)) is a directed graph. Proposition 1 below
characterizes the rationalizability of a data set via an acyclicity condition, that is, the
revealed preferences of each student are not cyclical.
Proposition 1. A data set D is rationalizable if and only if (S ∪{i}, R(i)) admits no cycle
for all i ∈ I.
Proof. The only if-part is trivial. We prove the if-part below. Fix an arbitrary i ∈ I. Since
(S ∪ {i}, R(i)) admits no cycle, by the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem (Szpilrajn (1930)),
there exists an extension of i of R(i) such that i is a strict preference.
We show that {i}i∈I rationalizes D. Suppose to the contrary, D is not rationalized
by {i}i∈I . By definition, if the students’ preferences are {i}i∈I , then D contains
some matching µk that either violates individual rationality or is blocked. If µk violates
individual rationality, then there exists some student i such that i i µk(i). Since i is
matched with µk(i) in the matching µk and µk(i) 6= i, by the definition of R(i), we have
that (µk(i), i) ∈ R(i). This further implies that µk(i) i i. This violates the acyclicity of
i. If µk is blocked, then there exists some pair (i, s) such that s i µk(i) and i s a for
some a ∈ µk(s). By the definition of A(i, µk), we have that s ∈ A(i, µk). By the definition
of R(i), (µk(i), s) ∈ R(i). This further implies that µk(i) i s. Again, this violates the
acyclicity of i.
Remark 1. Echenique (2008) proposes a revealed preference test in a one-to-one marriage
market in which the preferences of agents on both sides of the market are unknown. In this
sense, our setting can be viewed as a special case of his. Indeed, Echenique (2008) also
characterizes the rationalizability of data sets in graph-theoretic terms. In our setting with
known priority orderings, Echenique (2008, Theorem 6.1) reduces to our Proposition 1.
Example 1 below illustrates how to use Proposition 1 to conduct the revealed preference
test.
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Example 1. Consider the matchings between students in I = {i1, i2, i3} and schools in
S = {s1, s2, s3}. The capacity of each school is one. The schools’ priority orderings over
individual students are given as follows:
s1 : i2 s1 i3 s1 i1 s1 s1
s2 : i3 s2 i1 s2 i2 s2 s2
s3 : i1 s3 i2 s3 i3 s3 s3
The data set consists of the following two observations D = {µ, µ′}, where
µ =
i1 i2 i3
s1 s3 s2
and µ′ =
i1 i2 i3
s3 s2 s1
.
The analysis is summarized in Table 1. Since c = 〈s1, s2, s1〉 is a cycle in the directed
graph (S ∪ {i3}, R(i3)), by Proposition 1, we conclude that D is not rationalizable.
Table 1: Revealed Preference Analysis in Example 1.
Matchings Students Matches Schools Available Revealed Preference
µ
i1 s1 s3 (s1, s3) (s1, i1)
i2 s3 s1 (s3, s1) (s3, i2)
i3 s2 s1 (s2, s1) (s2, i3)
µ′
i1 s3 s2 (s3, s2) (s3, i1)
i2 s2 s1 (s2, s1) (s2, i2)
i3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (s1, i3)
3.2 The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings
In this section, we provide an indirect approach to test the rationalizability of a data set.
This approach connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure
of the set of stable matchings.
We first introduce some notations for the lattice theory. For any two mappings µ and
µ′, we define their join (with respect to {s}s∈S) λ = µ ∨ µ′ such that λ maps each school
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s to its preferred set of students between µ(s) and µ′(s). Formally, for each s ∈ S,
λ(s) =

µ(s) if µ(s) = µ′(s);
µ(s) if µ(s) s µ′(s);
µ′(s) if µ′(s) s µ(s).
Analogously, we define their meet (with respect to {s}s∈S) ν = µ ∧ µ′ such that ν maps
each school s to its less preferred set of students between µ(s) and µ′(s). Formally, for each
s ∈ S,
ν(s) =

µ(s) if µ(s) = µ′(s);
µ(s) if µ′(s) s µ(s);
µ′(s) if µ(s) s µ′(s).
Note that the join and the meet of two mappings may not be well defined since a school
may be indifferent between two distinct sets of students. However, if µ and µ′ are stable
matchings, then their join and meet are well defined. This is because, under our assumptions
on preferences and priority orderings, schools have strict preferences over those groups
of students that they may be assigned at stable matchings (see, for example, Roth and
Sotomayor (1990, Theorems 5.26)).
It is well known that the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice (see, for
example, Knuth (1976), Blair (1984), and Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Theorem 5.31)).
Formally, if µ and µ′ be stable matchings, then λ = µ ∨ µ′ and ν = µ ∧ µ′ are well-defined
matchings and are stable matchings. The lattice structure of the set of stable matchings can
be used to refute the rationalizability of a data set, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 (Example 1 revisited). The data set and the schools’ priority orderings are the
same as in Example 1. We first compute the join and meet of the two matchings µ and µ′
as follows:
λ = µ ∨ µ′ = i3 i3 i1
s1 s2 s3
and ν = µ ∧ µ′ = i1 i2 i2
s1 s2 s3.
Suppose that D is rationalizable. By definition, there exists a profile of the students’
preferences such that both µ and µ′ are stable given the students’ preferences and the
schools’ priority orderings. By the lattice structure result, it must be that both λ and ν
are stable matchings. However, neither of the two matchings λ and ν is even well defined,
since λ matches student i3 with both schools s1 and s2, and ν matches student i2 with both
schools s2 and s3. Thus, we conclude that D is not rationalizable.
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More generally, let D0 = D. For each integer l ≥ 0, we define the following set Dl+1
such that each mapping in Dl+1 is the join of two mappings in Dl:
Dl+1 := {µ ∨ µ′ : µ, µ′ ∈ Dl}.
Whenever the joins are well defined, we keep constructing these sets until when Dl¯+1 = Dl¯.
Analogously, for each integer l ≥ 0, we define the following set D−(l+1) such that each
mapping in D−(l+1) is the meet of two mappings in D−l:
D−(l+1) := {µ ∧ µ′ : µ, µ′ ∈ D−l}.
Whenever the meets are well defined, we keep constructing these sets until when D−(l+1) =
D−l. When the joins and meets are always well defined, both l¯ and l exist. To see this,
note that we allow for the possibility that µ = µ′. Thus, Dl+1 ⊇ Dl and D−(l+1) ⊇ D−l for
all l. As such, both l¯ and l exist because we have finitely many students and finitely many
schools and thus finitely many mappings. When the joins and the meets are always well
defined, we let
DL+ :=
l¯⋃
l=0
Dl, DL
− :=
0⋃
l=−¯l
Dl, and DL := DL+ ∪DL−.
Suppose that D is rationalizable. It follows from the lattice structure result that
every mapping in DL is a well-defined matching. Thus, this is a necessary condition for
rationalizability. The readers might hope that this is also sufficient for the rationalizability
of a data set. This is not the case, as illustrated by Examples 3 below.
Example 3. Consider the matchings between one student i and one school s with its
capacity qs = 1. The priority ordering of school s is given by i s s. The data set consists
of the following two observations D = {µ, µ′}, where
µ =
i
s
and µ′ =
i (s)
(i) s
.
It is easy to see that DL = D = {µ, µ′}. Note that every mapping in DL is a well-defined
matching. However, D is not rationalizable, since the stability of µ requires that s i i and
the stability of µ′ requires that i i s.
In Example 3, the set of students matched and school seats filled is different in the two
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matchings in D. Indeed, the celebrated Lone Wolf Theorem shows that when all preferences
and priority orderings over individuals are strict, the set of students matched and school
seats filled is the same at every stable matching (see, for example, Roth and Sotomayor
(1990, Theorem 5.12)). Thus, another necessary condition for the rationalizability of a
data set D is that the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same for all
matchings in D.
Even if every mapping in DL is a well-defined matching and the set of students matched
and school seats filled is the same for all matchings in D, D may still not be rationalizable.
We present such an example below.
Example 4. Consider the matchings between students in I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} and schools in
S = {s1, s2}. The capacity of each school is two. The priority orderings of schools are given
as follows:
s1 : i1, i2 s1 i1, i3 s1 i1, i4 s1 i2, i3 s1 i2, i4 s1 i3, i4 s1 i1 s1 i2 s1 i3 s1 i4 s1 s1
s2 : i1, i2 s2 i1, i3 s2 i2, i3 s2 i1, i4 s2 i2, i4 s2 i3, i4 s2 i1 s2 i2 s2 i3 s2 i4 s2 s2
The two priority orderings differ only in the ranking between {i1, i4} and {i2, i3}. It is easy
to verify that both priority orderings are responsive. The data set consists of the following
two observations D = {µ, µ′}, where
µ =
i1, i4 i2, i3
s1 s2
and µ′ =
i2, i3 i1, i4
s1 s2
.
It is easy to see that DL = D = {µ, µ′}. Note that (1) every mapping in DL is a well-defined
matching; and (2) the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same in all the
matchings in D. However, D is not rationalizable, since the stability of µ requires that
s1 i1 s2 and the stability of µ′ requires that s2 i1 s1.
We say that {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered if for any µ, µ′ ∈ D, µ(s) s µ′(s)
implies i s i′ for all i ∈ µ(s) and i′ ∈ µ′(s) − µ(s).4 That is, s prefers every student in
its entering class at µ to every student who is in its entering class at µ′ but not at µ. In
Example 4, neither of the sets {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered. Theorem 5.27 in
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) shows that in settings in which the preferences and the priority
orderings over individuals are strict and the priority orderings are responsive, if µ and µ′
are stable matchings and µ(s) s µ′(s) for some school s, then i s i′ for all i in µ(s) and
4µ′(s)− µ(s) is the difference between two unordered family of elements of I ∪ {s}.
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i′ in µ′(s)− µ(s). Thus, a third necessary condition for the rationalizability of a data set D
is that {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered for all s ∈ S.
We have now presented three necessary conditions for the rationalizability of a data set
D, namely,
1. every mapping in DL is a well-defined matching;
2. the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same for all matchings in D;
3. {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered for all s ∈ S.
As we have discussed above, these three conditions echo the lattice structure result, the Lone
Wolf Theorem, and the theorem that states that the set of matches of each school under
stable matchings is responsively ordered. We also illustrate via Examples 2 - 4 how these
conditions can be used to refute the rationalizability of some data set. Our main result,
Theorem 1, shows that these three conditions are also sufficient for the rationalizability of
a data set.
Theorem 1. A data set D is rationalizable if and only if
(1) DL ⊆M ;
(2) the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same for any matching in D;
(3) {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered for all s ∈ S.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 shows that the three conditions together are sufficient for the
rationalizability of a data set. None of these conditions can be dropped for the sufficiency
part (unless we impose more structure on the environment such as one-to-one matchings).
In Example 2, the second and the third conditions are met. In Example 3, the first and the
third conditions are met. In Example, 4, the first and the second conditions are met. As we
have discussed, none of the data sets in these examples are rationalizable.
Remark 3. We hasten to emphasize that Theorem 1 hinges on the assumption that the
schools’ priority orderings are known. Without knowledge of the schools’ priority orderings,
we would not be able to conduct the join and meet operations.
Before we present the proof of Theorem 1, we briefly discuss the special case of one-to-one
matching markets. We note that Theorem 1 can be simplified. This is because the third
condition in Theorem 1 is vacuous in one-to-one matching markets. We formally state this
observation as a corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the capacity of each school is one. A data set D is rationalizable
if and only if
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(1) DL ⊆M ;
(2) the set of students matched and school seats filled is the same for any matching in D.
We now present the proof of Theorem 1. Note that we have established that each of
the three conditions is a necessary condition for the rationalizability of a data set in the
discussions that lead to Theorem 1. Hence, we shall not repeat these arguments.
Proof of Theorem 1. (The if-part) Suppose that all the conditions hold. We show that that
data set D is rationalizable. Our proof is constructive. Step (1) explicitly constructs a class
of the students’ preferences, and Step (2) verifies that every matching in D is stable given
any preferences of the students in this class and the schools’ priority orderings.
Step (1). For any two matchings µ, µ′ ∈ DL such that µ′ ≥S µ and each i ∈ I, if
µ′(i) 6= µ(i), we define
µ(i) i µ′(i). (2)
Since the order ≥S on the set of matchings M is a partial order, we know that i is a strict
partial order.5 We claim that, for each i ∈ I, i is complete over {µ(i) : µ ∈ DL}. To see
this, note that for each i ∈ I and two distinct schools s′, s′′ ∈ {µ(i) : µ ∈ DL}, there exist
two matchings µ′, µ′′ ∈ DL such that µ′(i) = s′ and µ′′(i) = s′′. Since µ′ ∨ µ′′ ∈ DL by the
construction of DL, one of the following cases must occur:
(a) µ′ ∨ µ′′ ≥S µ′ and (µ′ ∨ µ′′)(i) 6= µ′(i);
(b) µ′ ∨ µ′′ ≥S µ′′ and (µ′ ∨ µ′′)(i) 6= µ′′(i).
Therefore, by the construction in (2), we have either s′ i s′′ or s′′ i s′.
By the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem (Szpilrajn (1930), i can be extended to a strict
preference on S ∪ {i}. Thanks to the completeness of i over {µ(i) : µ ∈ DL}, we can take
a preference profile in the particular class of extensions with the following property:
s i s′, for all s ∈ {µ(i) : µ ∈ DL} and all s′ ∈ S ∪ {i} \ {µ(i) : µ ∈ DL}. (3)
In words, for each i ∈ I, schools that are never matched to i are in the tail of i’s preference
list.
Step (2). Next, we verify that D is rationalized by any preference profile that satisfies
(2) and (3). Fix such a preference profile {i}i∈I . In what follows, we show that every
matching in DL is stable given this preference profile of the students and the schools’
5A strict partial order is a binary relation that is irreflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
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priority orderings, i.e., we show that DL is rationalizable; since D ⊆ DL, this implies that
D is rationalizable.
Take an arbitrary µ ∈ DL. We argue that µ is stable by showing that µ is both
individually rational and unblocked. First, if µ is not individually rational under {i}i∈I ,
then there exists some i such that i i µ(i). By the construction in (2) and (3), i i µ(i)
only if there exists some µ′ ∈ DL such that µ′(i) = i. But then, i is matched to some
school under µ and i remains unmatched under µ′. We arrive at a contradiction to the
second condition. Therefore, µ is individually rational.
Second, if µ is blocked, then there exists a pair (i′, s) such that µ(i′) 6= s, s i′ µ(i′) and
i′ s a for some a ∈ µ(s). By the construction in (2) and (3), s i′ µ(i′) only if there exists
µ′ ∈ DL such that µ′(i′) = s and µ ≥S µ′, where the latter implies that µ(s) s µ′(s) since
DL is well defined and µ(s) 6= µ′(s). Since {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered, we know
that i s i′′ for all i ∈ µ(s) and i′′ ∈ µ′(s)− µ(s). Obviously, i′ ∈ µ′(s)− µ(s). Therefore,
we arrive at a contradiction to i′ s a for some a ∈ µ(s).
The first condition in Theorem 1 states that every matching in DL is a well-defined
matching. We now prove a result that simplifies the task of checking whether this condition
holds. Theorem 2 below shows that under the second condition and the third condition in
Theorem 1, every mapping in DL+ is a well-defined matching if and only if every mapping
in DL− is a well-defined matching. Formally,
Theorem 2. For any data set D such that the set of students matched and school seats
filled is the same for any matching in D and {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered for all
s ∈ S, DL+ ⊆M if and only if DL− ⊆M .
Proof. Fix a data set D such that the set of students matched and school seats filled is the
same for any matching in D and {µ(s) : µ ∈ D} is responsively ordered for all s ∈ S. In
what follows, we first claim that if DL+ is well defined, then any school that does not fill
its quota at some matching in D is assigned precisely the same set of students at every
matching in D, i.e., s ∈ µ(s) for some s ∈ S and some µ ∈ D implies that µ′(s) = µ(s) for
all µ′ ∈ D. To see the claim, suppose there exists µ′ ∈ D such that µ′(s) 6= µ(s). Since
DL+ is well defined, one of the following cases must occur:
(i) µ(s) s µ′(s);
(ii) µ′(s) s µ(s).
Suppose, say, (i) occurs. If µ′(s) contains more students than µ(s), then µ′(s)−µ(s) contains
at least one student. Thus, responsive ordering implies that s s i for all i ∈ µ′(s)− µ(s).
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This is a contradiction to the individual rationality of s under µ′. If µ′(s) contains less
students than µ(s), then s ∈ µ′(s)− µ(s). Thus, responsive ordering implies that s s s,
which is again a contradiction. Symmetric arguments can reach contradictions if (ii) occurs.
Therefore, µ′(s) = µ(s) for all µ′ ∈ D.
Next, we claim that the set of matched students under λ := µ ∨ µ′, denoted by λ(S),
is the same as the sets under µ and µ′, denoted by µ(S) and µ′(S), where µ(S) = µ′(S)
due to condition (2). Obviously, the definition of λ implies that λ(S) ⊆ µ(S). Since any
school that does not fill its quota at some matching in D is assigned precisely the same set
of students at every matching in D, we know that for each school the number of matched
students under λ is the same as that under µ, though the sets of students may intersect
across schools. Since λ is matching, we know that those sets of students across schools are
mutually disjoint. Therefore, the number of students contained in λ(S) is the same as that
contained in µ(S). As a result, λ(S) ⊆ µ(S) implies λ(S) = µ(S).
Now we show that if λ is a matching, then ν := µ ∧ µ′ must also be a matching, i.e.,
(i) |ν(i)| = 1 for every i and ν(i) = i if ν(i) /∈ S; (ii) |ν(s)| = qs for every s, and if the
number of students in ν(s), say r, is less than qs, then ν(s) contains qs − r copies of s;
and (iii) ν(i) = s if and only if i ∈ ν(s) for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S. Since µ and µ′ are
both matchings, (ii) holds trivially. Since ν(i), i ∈ I, is defined according to ν(s), s ∈ S, it
then suffices to show that under ν, no student can be assigned to more than one schools.
Suppose to the contrary that i ∈ ν(s) and i ∈ ν(s′) for s 6= s′. Then one of the following
cases must occur because both µ and µ′ are matchings:
(a) µ(s) s µ′(s), i ∈ µ′(s), µ′(s′) s′ µ(s′) and i ∈ µ(s′);
(b) µ′(s) s µ(s), i ∈ µ(s), µ(s′) s′ µ′(s′) and i ∈ µ′(s′).
Note that i can be assigned only to s or s′ under λ. Suppose case (a) occurs. Since i ∈ µ′(s),
we know that i /∈ µ′(s′). Similarly, since i ∈ µ(s′), we know that i /∈ µ(s). Therefore,
i /∈ λ(s) and i /∈ λ(s′), i.e., i is unmatched under λ, a contradiction to λ(S) = µ(S). A
symmetric argument can reach the same contradiction if (b) occurs. Hence, ν is a matching.
Induction shows that if DL+ ⊆M , then DL− ⊆M . Moreover, the converse is true by
symmetric arguments. This completes the proof.
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4 Discussions
4.1 Identification of Possible Preferences
Suppose that a data set D is rationalizable. In this subsection, we discuss the possible
preference profiles that rationalize the data set.
For the approach in Section 3.1, recall that we have defined in (1) the set of pairwise
relations R(i) for each student i. We say a preference i over S ∪ {i} is consistent with
R(i) if (s, s′) ∈ R(i) implies s i s′. It is standard to have the following observation (see,
for example, Chambers and Echenique (2016)): A preference profile {i}i∈I rationalizes D
if and only if i is consistent with R(i) for all i.
For the approach we studied in Section 3.2, we have defined some pairwise relations
in (2). Using (3), we further extend the pairwise relations to a preference profile that
rationalizes the data set D. Unlike the extensions of {R(i)}i∈I , an arbitrary extension
of the relations defined in (2) may not rationalize D when it is rationalizable. To see
this, we consider a singleton data set D = {µ} such that, say, µ(i) = s. Obviously, D is
rationalizable and we must have s i i. However, (2) defines no pairwise relation, which
means that the possible extensions include the counterfactual case i i s.
However, we do have the following observation regarding to the relations defined in (2):
Suppose D is rationalizable. If for two matchings µ, µ′ ∈ DL such that µ′ ≥S µ and some
student i ∈ I, we have µ′(i) 6= µ(i), then (µ(i), µ′(i)) is in the transitive closure of R(i).
This is an implication of the previous observation, since the transitive closure of R(i) is
the set of all sure preferences and the relations in (2) must be true when the data set is
rationalizable.
4.2 Extreme Stable Matchings
Given a preference-priority profile that satisfies our assumptions, i.e., strictness and respon-
siveness, we know that the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice. Among the
stable matchings, the student optimal one and the school optimal one are of particular
interest. In our framework, we are also keen to understand how these extreme matchings
are related to the revealed preference analysis. Suppose a data set D is rationalizable. On
the one hand, knowing that D contains an extreme stable matching will provide us some
information of the preferences to be revealed. On the other hand, we may also want to test
whether there could be an extreme stable matching in the data set.
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Suppose D contains the student optimal stable matching. Then, we can identify a
unique candidate of the student optimal stable matching using schools’ priorities: there
must be a matching µ ∈ D such that for any other matching µ′ ∈ D, µ′(s) <s µ(s) for
all s ∈ S. Given such a µ, the implication on the unknown student preferences is that
µ(i) <i µ′(i) for all i ∈ I and µ′ ∈ D, where the relation is strict if µ(i) 6= µ′(i). The
discussion for the school optimal stable matching is symmetric.
To test whether there could be a student optimal stable matching in the data set, it
suffices to check if there exists a matching µ ∈ D such that for any other matching µ′ ∈ D,
µ′(s) <s µ(s) for all s ∈ S. To see this, suppose we have identified such a matching µ. We
construct the students’ preferences in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1, except
that we need to replace (3) with
s i i i s′, for all s ∈ {µ(i) ∈ S : µ ∈ DL} and all s′ ∈ S \ {µ(i) ∈ S : µ ∈ DL}. (4)
Then, at matching µ, every student is matched with her favorite school. Thus, it is
straightforward to verify that µ is the student optimal stable matching under the constructed
preference profile, which is also the minimum point of DL. Moreover, the maximum point
of DL is the school optimal stable matching.
To test whether there could be a school optimal stable matching in the data set, it
suffices to check if there exists a matching µ ∈ D such that for any other matching µ′ ∈ D,
µ(s) <s µ′(s) for all s ∈ S. To see this, suppose we have identified such a matching µ. We
construct the students’ preferences in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1, except
that we need to replace (3), again, with (4). Then, at matching µ, every student is matched
with the least preferred school among those acceptable ones. Thus, it is straightforward
to verify that µ is the student worst (equivalently, school optimal) stable matching under
the constructed preference profile, which is also the maximum point of DL. Moreover, the
minimum point of DL is the student optimal stable matching.
We summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A data set D is rationalizable with µ ∈ D being the student optimal
stable matching if and only if conditions (1)-(3) hold and for any other matching µ′ ∈ D,
µ′(s) <s µ(s) for all s ∈ S. Symmetrically, a data set D is rationalizable with µ ∈ D being
the school optimal stable matching if and only if conditions (1)-(3) hold and for any other
matching µ′ ∈ D, µ(s) <s µ′(s) for all s ∈ S.
Nevertheless, even if D contains both extreme matchings, DL may not be the set of
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stable matchings.
Example 5. Consider a school choice market with four students and two schools whose
quotas are both two, i.e., I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, S = {s1, s2}, and qs1 = qs2 = 2. The priority
orderings of schools are given as follows:
s1 : i2, i4 s1 i2, i3 s1 i2, i1 s1 i4, i3 s1 i4, i1 s1 i3, i1 s1 i2 s1 i4 s1 i3 s1 i1 s1 s2
s2 : i1, i3 s2 i1, i2 s2 i1, i4 s2 i3, i2 s2 i3, i4 s2 i2, i4 s2 i1 s2 i3 s2 i2 s2 i4 s2 s1.
The two orderings are obviously responsive. The data set consists of the following two
observations D = {µ, µ′}, where
µ =
i2, i4 i1, i3
s1 s2
and µ′ =
i1, i3 i2, i4
s1 s2
.
It is easy to see that DL = D = {µ, µ′} and that the data set is rationalizable. More
precisely, the revealed student preferences from (2) are:
i1 : s1 i1 s2 i2 : s2 i2 s1
i3 : s1 i3 s2 i4 : s2 i4 s1
However, the set of stable matchings under the revealed preferences and the school priorities
also includes, say,
µ′′ =
i3, i4 i1, i2
s1 s2
.
4.3 Assumptions on Preferences
Our model makes two assumptions over the students’ preferences and the schools’ priority
orderings, namely, strictness and responsiveness. More precisely, we assume that the stu-
dents’ preferences over schools are strict, and the schools’ priority orderings over individual
students are strict. We also assume that the schools’ priority orderings over sets of students
are responsive. In this subsection, we investigate the relaxation of these assumptions.
When the students’ preferences or the schools’ priority orderings over individual students
are not strict, we can still test the rationalizability of a data set using the first approach
in Section 3.1. The only difference is in the interpretation of R(i). Precisely, in this case
(a, a′) ∈ R(i) means that a is revealed to be weakly preferred to a′ by student i. In contrast,
the approach that we developed in Section 3.2 is not applicable any more when we drop
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the strictness assumption. Particularly, Theorem 1 fails because the set of stable matchings
does not have any of the three properties (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990, pp. 48-50 and
pp. 162-163) for examples).
When preferences (priorities over individuals) are strict but not necessarily responsive,
again, we can still test the rationality of a data set as in Section 3.1, except that the
collection of schools that are revealed to be available to student i under matching µk is
now defined as
A(i, µk) := {s ∈ S : s 6= µk(i) and µk(s) ∪ {i} s µk(s)}.
It is known that stable matchings exist under more general school priorities such
as substitutable priorities (see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)) and bilateral substitutable
priorities (see Hatfield and Kojima (2008) and Hatfield and Kojima (2010)). However,
the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings may or may not be preserved. For
example, it is not preserved under bilateral substitutable priorities but is preserved under
the substitutable priorities. When the lattice structure is not preserved, our analysis in
Section 3.2 cannot be applied. When it is preserved as in Martínez et al. (2001) and Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005), the lattice is with respect to the students’ (doctors’ or workers’ in
their papers) preferences, which is unknown in our context such that we cannot apply the
join and meet operators.6
4.4 Supply and Demand
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) develop a framework to apply the supply and demand analysis
to matching markets. In our paper, since schools’ priority orderings are known, each
student’s budget set can be recovered from the observed matchings in the data set. To
connect with the classic framework of Afriat (1967), for each school s ∈ S, let θks ∈ RN
denote the characteristic of school s at period k. Each dimension of θks is an attribute of
the school. For example, the first dimension could represent the reputation of the school
6In the context of matching with contracts, i.e., Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), the lattice structure
is with respect to the doctors in the following sense: Given a stable allocation, we need to recover the
opportunity sets of doctors and hospitals in order to pin down a point in the lattice, where the recovery uses
the doctors preferences. Technically, one could study the case where the lattice structure is preserved, the
students’ preferences are known, and the schools’ priorities are to be revealed. Since Examples 3 and 4 show
the insufficiency of DL ⊆M , one needs more properties of stable matchings such as (2) and (3) in Theorem
1 to guarantee the rationalizability of a data set. However, for example, the rural hospital property is
preserved only under additional assumptions, such as the law of aggregate demand in Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005); and it is unclear how responsive ordering may be preserved. We leave such an extension as an open
question.
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and the second dimension could represent the average salary of students after graduation.
The preferences of students could be defined over RN . We could restrict our attention
to strictly monotone preferences, i.e. θ > θ′ implies that θ is strictly preferred to θ′. We
adopt the framework of Nishimura et al. (2017). Consider a preorder D defined over RN
such that θ D θ′ if and only if θ ≥ θ′. Let . denote the asymmetric part of the preorder.
We seek to identify a preference relation %i for each student i such that %i extends the
preorder D7 and strictly rationalizes8 the matching outcome.
Formally, fix the schools’ preferences and capacities {qs,s}s∈S. For each observation
k ∈ K, let Θk = {θks}s∈S ∪ {0} ⊂ RN denote the set of schools’ characteristics at period k
where 0 = (0, ..., 0) is the outside option of not matching. We could recover the budget
set of agent i at period k as Bki ⊂ Θk. With the observed matching µk, we could recover
the choice function of agent i as ci such that ci(Bki ) = µk(i). Denote by Ai as the set of
budgets of agent i.
For each agent i, we have established her choice environment ((RN ,D),Ai) and the
attached choice function ci. Here, we want to recover the preference of student i over RN
such that the preference strictly rationalizes the choice of the student while maintaining
the property of monotonicity, i.e., extending the preorder D. Nishimura et al. (2017) show
how to perform the extension. In particular, when the underlying preorder is continuous9,
they provide a sufficient and necessary condition for extending the preorder to a continuous
preference while strictly rationalizing the observed choice function.
4.5 Multiple observations
In this subsection, we discuss several settings in which one has multiple observations of
(stable) matchings. We first consider a school choice setting in which we assume that
individuals with the same characteristics are identical and have identical preferences. We
then analyze a graduate rotational program in large corporations. Finally, we study an
evolving labor market with retirements and new entries.
School choice setting. In a school choice setting, while the schools remain active for
multiple periods, the students are different in each period. Thus, the matchings are not
7A complete pre-order % is said to extend D if θ D θ′ implies θ % θ′ and θ . θ′ implies θ  θ′ where 
is the asymmetric part of %.
8By strict rationalization, we mean that the student strictly prefers the matched school within the
budget set, which is consistent with the whole framework of our paper.
9Consider a topological space X. A binary relation R ⊂ X ×X is said to be continuous if R is a closed
subset of X ×X.
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among the same set of agents. As in Echenique et al. (2013), we assume that students
with the same characteristics are identical and have identical preferences. In this case, we
have multiple observations of matchings that fit our framework. While this is a strong
assumption, without it, the theory has no testable implications in the following sense: any
data set such that every matching in the data set is individually rational for all school
could be trivially rationalizable.
Graduate rotational program. In many large corporations, new employees rotate among
different divisions for multiple rounds. In each round, bilateral selection produces a new
matching. The pool of agents is the same in all rounds.
Our main result is not a complete characterization of the rationalizability of a data
set in this setting. This is because the matchings produced from the Graduate Rotational
Program are history dependent, i.e., a particular match appears at most once. If employee
i is matched with division s in a particular round, employee i will not be matched with
division s in other rounds, even if i ranks s highest and s ranks i highest.
The sufficiency part of our analysis still has a bite. If a data set is rationalizable when we
ignore the constraint that a particular match appears at most once, then it is rationalizable
with the constraint. The necessity part does not apply, as illustrated by the Example 6
below.
Example 6 (Example 1 revisited). Consider the matchings between employees in I =
{i1, i2, i3} and divisions in S = {s1, s2, s3}. The capacity of each division is one. The
divisions’ priority orderings over individual students are given as follows:
s1 : i2 s1 i3 s1 i1 s1 s1
s2 : i3 s2 i1 s2 i2 s2 s2
s3 : i1 s3 i2 s3 i3 s3 s3
The data set consists of the following two observations D = {µ, µ′}, where
µ =
i1 i2 i3
s1 s3 s2
and µ′ =
i1 i2 i3
s3 s2 s1
.
We have shown in Example 1 and Example 2 that the data set is not rationalizable when
we ignore the constraint that a particular match appears at most once. We argue that if µ
happens earlier than µ′, then this data set is rationalizable with the constraint. In particular,
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let the employees’ preferences be as follows:
i1 : s1 i1 s3 i1 s2 i1 i1
i2 : s3 i2 s2 i2 s1 i2 i2
i3 : s2 i3 s1 i3 s3 i3 i3
Then, µ is stable. Moreover, µ′ is stable because s1 has been matched with s1, i2 has been
matched with s3, and i3 has been matched with s2 in previous rounds.
Evolving labor market. In an evolving labor market (see, for example, Blum et al.
(1997)), we have observations of different matchings at different stages. Although the set of
agents evolves over time due to retirements and new entries, our analysis can be used to
refute the rationalizability of a data set.
We consider multiple matchings, where the sets of agents in different matchings are not
necessarily the same. We note that if a matching is stable, then any sub-matching, which
is a restriction of the original matching on a subset of agents such that no match is broken,
is stable. Therefore, by taking a subset of the data set and restricting attention to the
set of common agents such that they are matched only to agents in the set under all data
points, we have a data set that fits our framework. Our theory, which can be applied to an
arbitrary subset of the data set, provides a necessary condition for the original data set to
be rationalizable.
Example 7 shows that our conditions are not sufficient.
Example 7. Consider the following evolving labor market with two periods t = 1, 2. The
capacity of each firm in each period is one. The set of agents in each period is reflected in
the matchings:
µ1 =
i1 i3
s1 s2
and µ2 =
i2 i3
s2 s1
.
The schools’ priority orderings are given as follows:
s1 : i2 s1 i3 s1 i1 s1 s1
s2 : i3 s2 i1 s2 i2 s2 s2.
Since there exists no common sub-matching where the matched agents are the same, our
conditions on common sub-matchings are trivially satisfied. However, the data set is not
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rationalizable,since the stability of µ0 requires that s2 i3 s1 and the stability of µ1 requires
that s1 i3 i2.
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